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Abstract
The role of mathematics in modern economics has been a topic of periodic dispute, 
which took on a new life with accusations concerning the limitations of mathemati-
cal models after the global crash of 2008. This article adds a historical dimension by 
considering some key past debates over the use of mathematics, including important 
statements by Alfred Marshall and John Maynard Keynes. It is proposed that the com-
plexities of economic systems and of human motivation do not themselves constitute 
arguments against the use of mathematics, but they should affect the kinds of math-
ematical approaches employed and the purposes to which it is oriented. Given this 
complexity, mathematics is less useful as a predictive tool and more useful for heuristic 
purposes. Economists should also pay attention to guiding metaphors and analogies that 
guide the uses of particular kinds of mathematics. 
Key-words: complexity, mathematics, economics
Resumen
El rol de la matemática en la economía moderna ha sido un tema de disputa periódica, 
la cual ha resurgido tras las acusaciones concernientes a las limitaciones de los modelos 
matemáticos luego de la crisis mundial del 2008. Este artículo aporta una dimensión 
histórica a dicho debate considerando algunas claves de los debates anteriores sobre 
el uso de las matemáticas, incluyendo las importantes posiciones de Alfred Marshall y 
John Maynard Keynes. El artículo propone que las complejidades del sistema econó-
mico y de las motivaciones humanas no constituyen en sí mismas argumentos contra el 
uso de las matemáticas, pero que, sin embargo, deben afectar el tipo de enfoque mate-
mático que se utiliza y el propósito hacia el cuál están orientadas. Dada la complejidad, 
la matemática tiene menos utilidad como herramienta predictiva y es más útil para fines 
heurísticos. Los economistas deberían también prestar atención a las las metáforas y 
analogías que guían el uso de tipos particulares de matemáticas.
Palabras claves: complejidad, matemáticas, economía.
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Introduction.
Economic systems and the motivations of agents within them are ex-
tremely complex. This has been widely acknowledged, at least since Adam 
Smith.1 At the same time it is widely believed that economics is a math-
ematical science and the extensive use of mathematics is vital to make 
economics ‘scientific’.Anyone trying to grapple with economic concepts, 
their development and their applications must have at least some rudi-
mentary knowledge of mathematics and statistics. It is also undeniable 
that some mathematical formalisations have played a key role in the de-
velopment of economic ideas, from the link between marginal utility and 
calculus to the analysis of strategic interaction in game theory. Few would 
deny that such formalizations have enhanced our understanding. Econom-
ics stands way above the other social sciences in its degree of utilisation of 
mathematics, and consequently in terms of claims of its purported rigour.
Historical debates about the role of mathematics in economics are a useful 
background to contemporary debates about mathematics in economics. 
Historically this debate has touched on many issues and the diversity of 
concerns remains today. For instance there have been calls for a different 
kind of mathematics (e.g. McCloskey 1994, Potts 2000, Velupillai 2000, 
Colander et al. 2008), especially to deal with the complexity of economic 
reality. We find claims that the assumptions used in mathematics should be 
more empirically grounded (e.g. Leontief 1982). And several scholars call 
for the role and purpose of mathematics to be reconfigured– addressing 
the limits to accurate prediction in complex systems for example – rather 
than proposing that mathematics should be abandoned. 
The debate about the nature and role of mathematics in economics was 
heightened after the Great Crash of 2008. Recognizing that mathemati-
cal models have played an enormous role in the generation of advice for 
financial institutions on how to spread their risks, critics observed that 
these models had helped to generate dangerous over-optimism and in-
stitutional complacency concerning high levels of lending. Many models, 
calibrated with data stretching back for decades before 2008, broke down 
during the financial crash of that year. A closely-related concern was that 
economists had been beguiled by free and deregulated markets largely be-
cause their models suggested that deregulated markets were self-adjusting 
and more efficient. But having a self-righting model of a market does not 
mean that markets are self-righting in the real world. Standard models as-
1 This essay makes extensive use of material from the Introduction to Hodgson (2012). 
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sume away some of the sources of market destabilization, particularly by 
making highly optimistic assumptions concerning the availability and use 
of relevant information. 
One incident prompted considerable attention and debate. In November 
2008 Queen Elizabeth of the United Kingdom visited the London School 
of Economics and she was heard asking why so few economists had seen 
the Crash coming. In response two leading British economists sent a let-
ter to Her Majesty, largely in defence of the economics profession (Besley 
and Hennessy 2009). This prompted another, more critical, letter to the 
Queen (Dow et al. 2009). Both interventions received widespread public-
ity in the press. In the same year Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman (2009) 
wrote in the New York Times:
Few economists saw our current crisis coming, but this predictive 
failure was the least of the field’s problems. More important was 
the profession’s blindness to the very possibility of catastrophic 
failures in a market economy ... the economics profession went 
astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in im-
pressive-looking mathematics, for truth ...
If these claims are true, then the role, scope and nature of the mathematics 
used in economics must be re-evaluated. An insistence on the complexity 
of economic phenomena, the prevalence of uncertainty and the hetero-
geneity of agents is a vital first step. The standard post-Robbins view of 
economics, as being about optimal decisions facing well-defined choices 
with ample information, has to go. The real world, with all its complex-
ity, uncertainty and information scarcity has to be brought to bear on 
economic reasoning. Standard models that omit these elements have also 
failed to explain adequately the recent crisis. And as David Colander et.al. 
put it ‘the current academic agenda has largely crowded out research on 
the inherent causes of financial crises.’ (David Colander et.al. 2008, p. 2). 
That agenda now requires radical revision, using models that are more 
data-driven alongside discursive and historical analyses.
Whatever our view on the nature and role of mathematics in econom-
ics, there is no doubt that the twentieth century turned economics into 
a mathematical science. George Stigler et.al. (1995) examined the use 
of mathematical techniques in four leading journals of economics. They 
found a dramatic decrease in articles that use neither geometric represen-
tations nor mathematical notation from 95% in 1892 to 5.3% in 1990. 
After similar studies of the literature, Roger Backhouse (1998), Mark 
Blaug (1999; 2003) and E. Roy Weintraub (2002) argue that the ‘formal-
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ist revolution’ in economics was consolidated in the late 1950s. This trans-
formation was given some impetus by the long report to the American 
Economic Association by Howard R. Bowen (1953) that called for more 
extensive training in mathematics at graduate level.
The historical discussion in this essay shows different ways in which econ-
omists have reacted to the challenge of modelling a complex economic 
reality. Tony Lawson (1997) and others have argued that this real-word 
complexity and openness at best severely limits the role of mathematics, 
which essentially involves closed logical systems. While this critique has 
to be taken seriously, it overlooks the fact that mathematics is not neces-
sarily deployed either as a map of economic reality or a means of predict-
ing its future. An important additional role of mathematics is to aid the 
development of explanatory heuristics (Sugden 2001; Hodgson 2006, ch. 
7). Heuristics focus on specific causal mechanisms and not necessarily the 
system as a whole. Nevertheless, real-world complexity remains a major 
challenge. 
The aim of this article is to place the concerns raised above in their histor-
ical context, confining ourselves primarily to the period before 1945 but 
highlighting some post-1945 developments. The remainder of this article 
is organized in three sections. Section 1 addresses the issues surround-
ing the (limited) employment of mathematics in economics before Alfred 
Marshall. Section 2 considers the arguments made by Marshall and John 
Maynard Keynes for limiting the role of mathematics. Section 3 concludes 
the essay. 
Mathematics in economics before Marshall.
The writings of the classical economists are almost entirely discursive, 
save for a few arithmetical illustrations.Despite this, an early controversy 
exposed some key issues that were to underlie later debates concerning 
the role of mathematics. The modes of argument of Adam Smith, David 
Ricardo, Nassau Senior and Thomas Robert Malthus are manifestly dif-
ferent, with Ricardo and Senior being more concerned with the logical 
deduction of conclusions from a priori assumptions. While Smith attempt-
ed judiciously to blend induction with deduction, he also sought general 
principles and laws. But his classical successors such as Ricardo and espe-
cially Senior went much further. They pursued more and more an axiom-
atic and deductivist method, attempting to derive universal conclusions 
from a few professedly general and fundamental propositions.2Smith and 
2 I define deduction and deductivism in accord with their classic use in logic. Deduction ‘is used 
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Malthus were relatively more inclined to base their logic on empirical 
facts. Does the age-old philosophical controversy between induction (or 
empiricism) and deduction mirror later debates about the role of math-
ematics in economics?3
Because mathematical modelling was underdeveloped in economics in the 
nineteenth century, methodological controversies were typically framed 
in terms of deduction versus induction, or other versions of that dilemma. 
But the deductivist versus inductivist debate does not translate complete-
ly and directly into one concerning the promoters of mathematics and 
their critics. Deductivism does not necessarily imply the promotion of 
mathematical techniques, and empiricism does not necessarily imply their 
abandonment, as we shall show later with examples below. 
Hence one should not be misled into believing that there is a close cor-
respondence between, on the one hand, advocacy of deduction and the 
promotion of mathematics, and on the other hand, advocacy of induction 
or empiricism and a more cautious attitude to mathematical methods. 
This misconception has enjoyed a recent revival.4
In part what was at stake in these early controversies were claims con-
cerning the degree to which general principles of economics could be es-
tablished, the legitimacy of specific simplifications and abstractions (espe-
cially in regard to the complexities of economic systems and of individual 
motivation), and the extent to which any basic assumptions must rest on 
empirical evidence. These dilemmas relate to the question of mathemat-
ics, but in a more indirect and complicated way. 
A principal difference between Malthus and Ricardo was the extent to 
which they believed that simple theoretical models could illuminate 
economic reality or provide a basis for economic policy. Criticising the 
to denote arguments which are such that if their premises are true their conclusions must also, 
as a matter of logic, be true’ (Urmston 1989, p. 79). Note that some writers (see footnote 4) 
depart from this classic formulation and confusingly define deductivism in a very different way. 
3 Induction is an empirically-driven process involving the attempt to establish generalisations 
from a set of observations. Empiricism is the broad view that knowledge is based primarily on 
experience rather than on any body of theory. 
4 Note that Lawson’s (1997) close association of the use of mathematical modelling with de-
ductivism is based on an odd definition of the latter term. Others follow Lawson in making the 
association without making it clear that deductivism is being used in an atypical sense. Lawson 
(1997, pp. 16–17) regards ‘deductivism’ as presuming ‘event regularities’ or ‘constant conjunc-
tions of events or states of affairs’ with regularities of the form ‘whenever event x then event 
y’. This description of deductivism refers to empirical regularities concerning events rather 
than logical deductions concerning propositions. Hands (2001, p. 323 ff.) also points out that 
Lawson’s use of the term deductivism ‘is different from the way in which the term is gener-
ally used within the philosophical literature’. Hands (2001, p. 327) suggests and Wilson (2005) 
argues that in any case neoclassical economics does not fit Lawson’s own characterization of 
‘deductivism’.
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emphasis on over-simplification and generalisation, Malthus (1836, p. 4) 
wrote in 1819: ‘The principal cause of error, and of the differences which 
prevail at present among the scientific writers on political economy, ap-
pears to me to be a precipitate attempt to simplify and generalize.’ (Mal-
thus 1836, p. 4).
Malthus stressed the complex and varied nature of economic reality, and 
concluded that simple or general conceptual frameworks or formal mod-
els could at best be of highly limited use. In contrast, Ricardo upheld 
that simple models could somehow be representative of a wide set of 
varied and complex phenomena. This key methodological difference di-
vided two classical economists and reverberated through the history of 
economics for the next two hundred years. Significantly, John Maynard 
Keynes opined in 1933: ‘If only Malthus, instead of Ricardo, had been the 
parent stem from which nineteenth-century economics proceeded, what 
a much wiser and richer place the world would be today!’ (Keynes 1972, 
pp. 100-1).
One of the earliest and most important attempts to use mathematics sys-
tematically in economics was by AugustinCournot (1838) in his Researches 
on the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth. Cournot saw his ap-
proach as deductive as well as mathematical. A pioneer of mathematical 
economics, he also laid down some of the foundations of the marginalist 
or neoclassical approach in economic theory. He introduced the notions 
of function and probability into economic analysis and he was the first to 
express and illustrate supply and demand curves as functions of price. De-
spite the prescience and brillianceof his work, Irving Fisher (1898, p. 119) 
noted with regret that it was ‘passed over in silence, if not contempt’. 
The rise of the concept of marginal utility signalled a further opportunity 
for much greater use of mathematics in general and calculus in particular. 
Although it was not directly measurable, utility seemed an ideal candidate 
for uni-dimensional quantification.5 Albeit with contrasting modes of ap-
plication, this idea is manifest in the seminal marginalist treatises of Wil-
liam Stanley Jevons (1871), Carl Menger (1871) and Léon Walras (1874). 
But while Jevons, Menger and Walras are often lumped together, their ap-
proaches are quite different (Jaffé1976). Menger was the founder of the 
Austrian school and they regarded mathematical models as of limited use, 
despite the deductivist stance adopted by several members of that school. 
In contrast, for Jevons (1871, pp. 50, 52, 70), economics ‘must be per-
5 See Fisher (1892). Problems within this vision came later, with concerns about interpersonal 
comparisons of utility and the emergence of formulations in terms of ordinal rather than car-
dinal utility. 
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vaded by … the tracing out of the mechanics of self-interest and utility.’ 
He believed that ‘all economic writers must be mathematical so far as 
they are scientific at all.’ In part he justified this stance on the grounds that 
economics ‘deals in quantities’, particularly in the form of prices.6Jevons 
seemed to overlook that much of mathematics is not about quantities. His 
complementary presumption of utility as the goal of human behaviour 
also prompted a utilitarian analysis that subsumed other psychological no-
tions and any lingering Smithian ‘moral sentiments’. 
Francis Edgeworth pioneered a similar line, embracing both Benthamism 
and mathematics. Defending the idea that individuals maximize their own 
utility or pleasure, in his Mathematical Psychics Edgeworth argued that‘the 
conception of Man as a pleasure machine may justify and facilitate the employ-
ment of mechanical terms and Mathematical reasoning in social science.’ 
(Edgeworth 1881, p. 15). 
Further evidence for this connection comes from the work of the Ameri-
can neoclassical economist Irving Fisher. Originally trained as a math-
ematical physicist, Fisher was one of the earliest and most forceful evan-
gelists for mathematics in economics. Fisher (1892, p. 85) drew up a table 
of ‘mechanical analogies’ where a ‘particle’ in mechanics ‘corresponds 
to’ an ‘individual’ in economics, ‘Space’ ‘corresponds to’ ‘Commodity’, 
‘Force’ to ‘Marginal utility or disutility’, ‘Work’ to ‘Disutility’ and ‘Ener-
gy’ to ‘Utility’. Vilfredo Pareto justified the appeal to mechanics in similar 
terms:
Rational mechanics gives us a first approximation to the theory 
of the equilibrium and of the movements of bodies. ... Pure eco-
nomics has no better way of expressing the concrete economic 
phenomenon than rational mechanics has for representing the 
concrete mechanical one. It is at this point that there is a place 
for mathematics. ... It therefore appears quite legitimate to appeal 
also to mathematics for assistance in the solution of the economic 
problem. (Pareto 1897, p. 490)
The mention by Jevons, Edgeworth, Fisher and Pareto of ‘mechanics’ 
was no accidental turn of phrase. As with Walras (1874), the search for 
usable mathematical techniques had quickly gravitated towards physics 
(Mirowski 1989). The particular kind of late nineteenth-century phys-
ics provided specific formalisms (particularly those involving calculus), 
6 Mirowski (2012) points to the severe difficulties in this and other presumptions of an underly-
ing quantitative ontology. Prices depend on suppositions of invariance that are contingent rather 
than historically universal. The idea of using the presumed quantitative nature of the object of 
investigation as justification for the prevalent use of mathematics is thus undermined. 
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guided the general approach to modelling, enshrined the preoccupation 
with equilibria and elevated the supreme goal of prediction. Equipped 
with these metaphors, admiration for the genuine powers of mathemati-
cal technique, and expectations of greater forecasting ability, a number of 
leading neoclassical economists launched their campaign for formalism 
and precision into the twentieth century. 
The persistence of what has been described as ‘physics envy’ among econ-
omists has remained a major impulse to extend the scope of mathematics 
in their subject. But much of theory in the natural sciences is not articu-
lated mathematically. Furthermore, when some physicists have cast their 
eye on economics they have complained about the unfalsifiability or lack 
of empirical grounding for its assumptions (e.g. Chatterjee and Chakra-
bati 2007, pp. 250 ff.).
Cambridge qualms: Marshall and Keynes.
But while the marginalist or neoclassical approach invited a great deal 
of mathematical enterprise, the role of mathematics in economics then 
remained a matter of debate, even within the neoclassical camp. The key 
witness here is Marshall, the great synthesizer of neoclassical econom-
ics (Ekelund and Hébert 2002). His global status as the most important 
microeconomic theorist endured at least until the 1940s (and the delayed 
development and adoption of Walrasian general equilibrium theory). 
Making relatively less reference to mathematical physics, Marshall 
drew from the then-influential discourse of Spencerian evolution (Moss 
1990;Thomas 1991; Hodgson 1993a; 1993b). His primary invocation 
of Spencerianbiology rather than physics signalled a recognition of the 
complex and evolutionary character of economic systems (Raffaelli 2003; 
Cook 2009). The fact that he adopted a quite different underlying meta-
phor – taken from complexity-oriented Spencerian evolution rather than 
mechanics or physics – partially accounts for his much more cautious at-
titude to the use of mathematics in the development of economic theory.7
In methodological terms, Marshall tried to steer a middle course between 
deductivism and empiricism. In multiple editions of his Principles, Marshall 
(1920, p. 29) quoted and endorsed Gustav Schmoller’s statement that: 
‘Induction and deduction are both needed for scientific thought as the left 
foot and the right foot are both needed for walking.’8
7 It may also help to explain why Marshall was unable to develop his theoretical system further. 
When Marshall published his Principles in 1890 Spencer’s work on evolution was in its heyday. 
Fifteen years later it was widely abandoned (Hodgson 1993a; 1993b). 
8 Schmoller was a leading member of the German historical school. Marshall’s strong and re-
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Marshall was highly sceptical of naïve empiricism, on the one hand, and 
of excessive deductivism and formalism, on the other. He saw econom-
ic theory as an essential precondition of empirical enquiry, rather than 
something that emerged automatically from the gathering of facts. But 
he also saw limits to highly general ‘pure theory’ of the type found in the 
works of Ricardo and Jevons. Theory had to be immersed and qualified by 
empirical material. Hence on 12 October 1899 Marshall wrote to Wil-
liam A. S. Hewins, the first Director of the London School of Economics, 
concerning the economics curriculum at the School:
The fact is I am the dull mean man, who holds Economics to be 
an organic whole, and has little respect for pure theory (otherwise 
than as a branch of mathematics or the science of numbers), as for 
that crude collection and interpretation of facts without the aid of 
high analysis which sometimes claims to be part of economic his-
tory. (Whitaker 1996, vol. 2, p. 256)
Marshall again wrote to Hewins on 29 May 1900:
Much of ‘pure theory’ seems to me to be elegant toying: I habitu-
ally describe my own pure theory of international trade as a ‘toy’. 
I understand economic science to be the application of powerful 
analytical methods to unravelling the actions of economic and so-
cial causes, to assigning each its part, to tracing mutual interactions 
and modifications; and above all to laying bare the hidden causas-
causantes. (Whitaker 1996, vol. 2, p. 280)
Marshall thus emphasised the goal for the economist of understanding un-
derlying causes. Marshall wrote to Francis Edgeworth on 28 August 1902. 
Again he stressed that the role of theory was both essential and limited: 
In my view ‘Theory’ is essential. … But I conceive no more ca-
lamitous notion than that abstract, or general, or ‘theoretical’ eco-
nomics was economics ‘proper.’ It seems to me an essential but a 
very small part of economics proper: and by itself sometimes even 
– well, not a very good occupation of time. (Whitaker 1996, vol. 
2, p. 393)
Marshall not only charted a middle course between pure induction and 
deduction, he also was wary of excessive generalisation. For him, math-
ematical tools were of great use in the task of constructing and developing 
peatedly expressed sympathies for that school have been grossly underestimated by both his 
devotees and his critics (Hodgson 2001). 
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a theory, but they were useful primarily as means to clarify and render 
consistent the argument. Mathematics was not theory as such. Hence on 
27 February 1906 Marshall gave the following advice concerning the use 
of mathematics a letter to Arthur Bowley:
(1) Use mathematics as shorthand language, rather than as an en-
gine of inquiry. (2) Keep to them till you have done. (3) Translate 
into English. (4) Then illustrate by examples that are important in 
real life (5) Burn the mathematics. (6) If you can’t succeed in 4, 
burn 3. This I do often. (Whitaker 1996, vol. 3, p. 130).
Cambridge colleague and former student Arthur Pigou reminisced about 
Marshall: 
Though a skilled mathematician, he used mathematics sparingly. He 
saw that excessive reliance on this instrument might lead us astray 
in pursuit of intellectual toys, imaginary problems not conforming 
to the conditions of real life: and further, might distort our sense 
of proportion by causing us to neglect factors that could not easily 
be worked up in the mathematical machine. (Pigou 1925, p. 84) 
These sentiments are radically different to thosethat prevail in economics 
today.9 Marshall’s attitude to mathematics in the early years of the twenti-
eth century serves as a benchmark for much of the discipline at that time, 
alongside the strong and growing mathematical enthusiasm of a minority 
of academic economists. But by the end of the twentieth century, math-
ematics had indeed become the principal ‘engine of enquiry’ within the 
discipline, rather than a subservient tool of discursive theoretical develop-
ment. Abundant published models may be accused of neglecting‘factors 
that could not easily be worked up in the mathematical machine’. 
Marshall’s cautious attitude to the role of mathematics found later expres-
sion in the work of his Cambridge student John Maynard Keynes. Like 
Marshall, Keynes was no enemy of mathematical analysis, but he raised 
similar concerns regarding its possible misuse:
Too large a proportion of recent ‘mathematical’ economics are 
mere concoctions, as imprecise as the initial assumptions they rest 
on, which allow the author to lose sight of the complexities and 
interdependencies of the real world in a maze of pretentious and 
unhelpful symbols. (Keynes 1936, p. 298)
9 Weintraub (2002) argues that Marshall’s and Keynes’s views became rapidly unrepresentative 
even within Cambridge. 
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Keynes wrote to Roy Harrod on 16 July 1938: ‘In economics ... to con-
vert a model into a quantitative formula is to destroy its usefulness as an 
instrument of thought’ (Keynes 1973, p. 299). 
Keynes also addressed the rise of econometrics as a sub-discipline. ‘The 
Econometric Society, an International Society for the Advancement of 
Economic Theory in its Relation with Statistics and Mathematics’ (to give 
its full title) was formed in the USA in 1930. The birth of this society was 
an expression of the growing belief, particularly by the younger genera-
tion of economists, that mathematical and statistical techniques were es-
sential to provide rigour and predictive potential for economists. Among 
this younger generation was the Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen, who 
published a major treatise on the statistical testing of business-cycle theo-
ries, which was later to help him win the Nobel Prize. Tinbergen’s (1939; 
1940a) appeal for statistical testing was directed among others at the insti-
tutional economist Wesley C. Mitchell (1927) and his team in the National 
Bureau of Economic Research. They had developed methods of national 
income accounting and assembled extensive data on business cycles. Tin-
bergen wanted to use econometric methods to help generate and refine 
models of the business cycle. 
Keynes (1939) responded with a detailed critique of the econometric 
approach outlined by Tinbergen. Mary Morgan pointed out that Keynes 
‘had clearly not read the volume [by Tinbergen] with great care’ (Morgan 
1990, p. 121) and Tinbergen (1940b) was to draw attention to this deficit. 
But Keynes had some forceful arguments. First, because a complete list 
of variables could not in principle be provided(for reasons of ignorance, 
availability, difficulty of measurement or whatever),the selection of vari-
ables for regression analysis was inevitably partial and biased. 
Second, judgemental bias also entered the analysis with unavoidable but 
empirically ungrounded assumptions (typically concerning linearities and 
normal distributions) and in the choice of analytical techniques (including 
intrinsic estimates of time lags). Even if the full set of variables were speci-
fied (which is impossible in practice) different econometricians would be 
likely to reach different conclusions because of their reliance upon judge-
ment and their differences in prior assumptions. Keynes suggested that no 
combination of data and technique could resolve this issue: some judge-
mental biases would always be involved. Even with the best techniques 
available, the data do not guide us unambiguously or objectively to the 
truth. Unempirical, a priori assumptions are always and unavoidably in-
volved. Comparing econometrics to ‘alchemy’, Keynes (1940, p. 156) did 
Filo Econ (2013) 1: 25-4536
CIECE
not mince his words. 
Keynes’s second argument has been tested by experiment. Jan Magnus 
and Mary Morgan (1999) specified a single data set and asked eight teams 
of researchers to carry out the same set of applied econometric tasks, 
with whatever methods they chose. The eight participating teams pro-
duced different versions of the variables, constructed different models 
and used different measurement procedures. 
In his critique of Tinbergen, Keynes voiced misgivings about the use of 
mathematical and statistical techniques and upheld that empirical evi-
dence could not guide enquiry unaided by prior assumptions. Tinbergen 
advocated these techniques and adopted a version of empiricism, believ-
ing that evidence could guide enquiry to the truth. With the development 
of econometrics, the empiricist wing of the age-old methodological de-
bate could also find solace in mathematical technique. Advocates of math-
ematics no longer had to be champions of deductivism over empiricism. 
Keynes offered a powerful philosophical critique of this tendency. 
Significantly, Keynes’s position echoed that of Marshall (1885, p. 166) 
who argued that ‘facts by themselves are silent’ and insisted that some 
prior assumptions were always involved.10 Clearly, with both Keynes and 
Marshall, their qualms concerning the use of mathematical and statistical 
techniques did not emanate from naïve empiricism. Quite the opposite 
– their insistence was that prior assumptions were always involved. Con-
sequently economists should be educated in matters of judgment as well 
as technique. 
Both Marshall and Keynes showed that much powerful economic theory 
can be articulated verbally, and they are far from alone in this achievement. 
Other greats, including Smith, Ricardo, Mill, Marx, Veblen, Schumpeter 
and Hayek, come to mind. Mathematics plays a useful and sometimes 
vital complementary role, aiding conceptual clarification and providing 
thought-stretching heuristics. But historically much important theory in 
economics is verbal. 
But despite the influence of Keynesian macroeconomics from the 1940s 
to the 1970s, Keynes’s own ideas concerning the limitations of econo-
metrics did not prevail. Keynesian models were somewhat remote from 
Keynes’s own theory (Leijonhufvud 1968; Robinson 1975). 
10 In this regard both Marshall and Keynes anticipated the decisive philosophical argument 
against empiricism by Willard van Orman Quine (1951). Quine showed that all empirical en-
quiry rests on prior ontological assumptions that cannot in principle be tested empirically. Thor-
stein Veblen (e.g. 1900, pp. 241, 253; 1908, p. 397 ff.) had previously made the same point a 
number of times, but always in his typical, elliptic style. 
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Econometrics became established after 1945 as a major and prestigious 
branch of economics. The development of econometrics was both useful 
and important for economics and it gave the discipline a new character. 
Those that believe that the primary route to understanding is through 
empirical enquiry can be attracted to econometrics as a sophisticated and 
systematic set of techniques, to make sense of the interrelations and cor-
relations within a complex and extensive set of data. The more naïve their 
empiricism the less they would be concerned by the problem of unverifi-
able a priori judgements and assumptions that had been raised by Marshall 
and Keynes. After Tinbergen and others, mathematical economics could 
attract empiricists as well as deductivists. In the absence of more sophis-
ticated methodological and philosophical discussion, its victory would be 
assured. 
Alongside econometrics, Paul Samuelson (1947) established the founda-
tions for post-war mathematical economic theory. His work combined 
Walrasian general equilibrium theory with the ‘Keynesian’ macroeco-
nomic modelling that was ironically more the achievement of Keynes’s 
followers than Keynes himself. Samuelson’s formalised Walrasian-Keynes-
ian synthesis set the style for much of mathematical economics for the 
next 30 years. 
Concluding remarks.
Modern economics is highly diverse and includes a variety of approaches. 
Since 1980 game theory has become a major engine of theoretical enquiry 
in microeconomics. Yet dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models 
are still highly influential in mainstream economics. Behavioural and ex-
perimental economics have produced major challenges to the assumption 
of rational, maximizing behaviour, yet the rational expectations hypoth-
esis remains the convention in many macroeconomic models. Rational 
expectations modelling is generally based on the assumptions of well-or-
dered aggregate demand and a unique equilibrium, yet insurmountable 
problems with aggregation from individual to macroeconomic demand 
functions led precisely to the rise of game theory and the discovery in 
many games of multiple equilibria.11
The post-1980 promotion of game theory within mainstream economics 
meant a major change of mathematical repertoire. The turn means that 
much of mainstream economics is no longer linked so closely in its meta-
11 See Kirman (1989) and Rizvi (1994) for incisive accounts of the theoretical results that un-
dermined the general equilibrium approach and opened the door for game theory. 
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phors to mechanics or physics.12 But modern mainstream economics of-
ten claims to build models that generate predictions. Despite the changes 
in the mathematics, the influence of Milton Friedman’s (1953) famous 
argument – that the test of a theory is its capacity for prediction – remains 
strong. ‘Physics envy’ endures, but principally in terms of a predilection 
for prediction. More systematic research would be useful to determine 
the extent to which these impressions are valid. But there is already strong 
evidence of a remaining predilection for prediction in terms of the kinds 
of relevant mathematics that have been relatively neglected within the 
mainstream.
This may help to explain why some alternative approaches, includingSraf-
fian economics and Post Keynesian modelling, have been neglected by 
the mainstream. Sraffian analysis seems more concerned with theoretical 
explanation than prediction (Sraffa 1960). Post Keynesian models vary in 
their predictive claims (e.g. King 1996; Cornwall and Cornwall 2001), 
but any inclusion of Keynes’s (1936) concept of uncertainty (which by 
definition excludes any calculable probability) is bound to limit the pre-
dictive capacity of the model (Hodgson 2011).13
But the relative neglect in terms of potential mathematical exploitation 
is most obvious in regard to chaos theory and complexity theory. When 
chaos theory emerged in the 1980s and demonstrated that outcomes in 
complex, non-linear systems are often unpredictable, some mainstream 
economists met the new mathematics with a significant flurry of inter-
est.14
But mainstream discussion of chaos theory has since waned, and it has 
never been given the attention warranted by the ubiquity of non-lineari-
ties in the real world. A bibliometricanalysis shows that the frequency of 
the term ‘chaos theory’ in all JSTOR15 journals in economics reached a 
low level by 1995. Mainstream economics is not simply focused on math-
ematical models; it elevates those models that purport to yield predictions 
12 Mirowski (2002) sees modern mainstream economics as a ‘cyborg science’, using the meta-
phor of an information processor or automaton. 
13 Elsewhere I suggest additional reasons why works in Sraffian and Post Keynesian economics 
receive low citation levels (Hodgson 1997; 1999). Neither tradition has paid much attention 
the analysis of human agent or individual decision-making, by using insights from psychology 
and elsewhere. Consequently it they have done little to displace the mainstream notion of the 
rational utility-maximiser. 
14 See, for example, Baumol and Quandt (1985), Grandmont (1987), Barnett et al. (1989), 
Baumol and Benhabib (1989), Brock et al. (1991), Benhabib (1992), and Bullard and Butler 
(1993). Furthermore some Keynesians saw this as an opportunity to embrace a form of model-
ling that was consistent with their ideas (Day 1983; Day and Shafer 1985; Rosser 1991).
15 JSTOR is an online journal database that includes all the prestigious journals and many of 
more heterodox inclination. 
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and downplays those that show that our powers of prediction are limited. 
For example, a model of the business cycle developed by Richard Good-
win (1972; 1990) involves non-linear dynamics where (with some pa-
rameter values) outcomes are highly sensitive to initial conditions, thus 
eroding its predictive capacity. Despite its reputable mathematics and rel-
atively appealing formal characteristics, the Goodwin model has remained 
rarely cited in leading journals since its inception. Hodgson (2011) shows 
that to date since its initial publication it has received only eleven citations 
in articles in the ten most prominent journals of economics. It seems that 
ostensive relevance and a strong mathematical component are insufficient 
to gain mainstream attention.16
Neither has the so-called ‘complexity revolution’ yet shifted mainstream 
economics from its predictive goals. Although there has been significant 
discussion of complexity in mainstream journals, it has not yet shaken the 
belief that the main aim of economics is to build models that yield useful 
predictions. Rather than look real-world complexity in the face, econo-
mists have remained in an artificial world of much simpler models, partly 
to maintain the rhetoric of prediction. As yet, established techniques for 
dealing with complexity, such as agent-based modelling and Kauffman-
type NK models (Kauffman 1995), are generally rare in leading main-
stream journals of economics (although they are much more common 
in organisation science). A possible reason for the neglect is that these 
kinds of model are intended more as explanatory heuristics and as devices 
to explore emergent properties of complex systems. Their capacities for 
prediction are limited at best. 
Hence perhaps the focus on prediction has been a major factor in deter-
mining the kind of mathematics that mainstream economists have adopt-
ed. The hypothesis is confirmed by the evidence above, but would merit 
further investigation and detailed research. 
If the hypothesis were correct then it would reinforce another supposi-
tion about modern economics. This is the relative lack of reflection on 
insights from the modern philosophy of science on how sciences operate. 
Friedman’s (1953) paper is regarded by philosophers as a somewhat crude 
and ambiguous statement, where one is ‘free to choose’ one’s favoured 
interpretation (Mäki 2003). One wonders what scientific methodological 
criteria leading mainstream economists would claim to follow. Popperi-
an falsification would probably top the list, alongside Friedman’s test by 
16 Another relevant example is Velupillai’s (1996; 2000; 2005) argument, based in part on the 
consideration of computability, for an alternative form of mathematics for economics. 
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predictions. In practice, however, attempts at falsification are rare. More 
common are attempts to subject empirical results to ever-more stringent 
robustness checks. Knockout empirical tests are elusive, and in principle 
extremely difficult to assemble because of the number of variables in-
volved (Boland 1989).
Another remarkable fact is that leading advocates and critics of the math-
ematics in modern economics play little attention to the philosophical 
status of mathematical discourse (Mirowski 2012). Rival schools in the 
philosophy of mathematics discuss whether mathematics is itself real, or 
representative of reality, or a logical language, or a mental construction, 
or whatever (Benacerraf and Putnam 1984). For anyonewho is doing (or 
criticizing) mathematics, this matters. 
Consider also the difference between believing that reality is essentially 
mathematical and believing that it can be helpfully represented in math-
ematical terms.Most applied economists would probably fall into the lat-
ter camp. But some (and perhaps a growing number of) post-war eco-
nomic theorists seem to belong to the former. Yet there are philosophical 
gulfs between these views. A problem is that economists are discouraged 
from submitting their own philosophical reflections on the ontological 
and epistemic status of mathematics to leading journals of economics. It 
would be a worthwhile project to investigate the philosophical precon-
ceptions, partly by polling leading economists for their views. 
It would be wrong to claim that contemporary mainstream economics 
has detached itself from empirical evidence. David Colander (2005) has 
surveyed young economists in leading universities and detected a strong 
empirical turn in the discipline. It is also clear from inspection of lead-
ing journals in economics that articles involving the analysis of empirical 
data are commonplace. Much of this work is undeniably worthwhile. But 
a typical feature of this prestigious output is that more attention is paid 
to robustness tests of the econometric analysis than historical or other 
grounding of the basic questions or assumptions. Consequently, an arms 
race of econometric technique has escalated in the leading journals, in 
excess of other theoretical and judgemental considerations. The empirical 
turn in economics is welcome, but it should not be diverted into matters 
of competitive technical display, with technical steps of often-diminishing 
marginal benefit. 
A related problem is that while great stress is place on the benefits of 
precision yielded from the deployment of mathematical techniques, much 
less emphasis is placed on precision concerning the concepts involved. 
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For example, there are a number of articles that usefully test propositions 
concerning the role of institutions in economic development (e.g. Ace-
moglu et.al. 2002; Rodrik and Trebbi 2004). Typically, much more atten-
tion is played to the econometrics than to understanding the nature and 
functioning of institutions. Although institutionally-orientated analysis has 
become fashionable, there is a striking lack of attention to the meaning 
and definition of an institution. Despite the ‘institutional turn’ in econom-
ics and other social sciences, one waits in hope for an essay devoted to a 
forensic discussion of the concept of an institution to be published in a 
prestigious mainstream journal. 
Another case in point is the theory of the firm. Models in the area abound 
(e.g. Aoki 1990; Hart and Moore 1990), but by contrast little attention 
is given to determining what a firm is. There is simply no consensus on 
the definition of the firm. But conceptual precision is just as important as 
mathematical precision. 
Overall, the foremost matter of concern is that the predominant empha-
sis on technique diverts attention away from key matters of assumption 
and judgment that always precede the application of any technique and 
the building of any model. Students of economics are given insufficient 
encouragement to question basic assumptions. Economists need to be 
trained to make critical judgements as well as producing models. As with 
the expert chess player, trained judgement involves both analysis and in-
tuition (Simon 1987; Frantz 2005). 
Models have to be put in their place alongside conceptual, philosophical, 
historical and other considerations. We need to be able to criticise as-
sumptions and discriminate between models. Given that decisive empiri-
cal tests are rarely possible, other factors have to be taken into account 
when evaluating different models. Broadly-trained judgement is vital. Its 
role is enhanced precisely because of the complexity of the phenomena at 
hand. 
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